Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017) Part IIIA
7 THE GREAT WAR AND THE RISE OF REZA KHAN (1914–1925)
1921年2月21日，Cossack Division军官Reza Khan发动军事政变。
Reza Khan’s meteoric rise to power and eventual establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925 was as much the outcome of the frustrations and setbacks experienced after the Constitutional Revolution as it was the outcome of a decade-long foreign occupation and imperial ambitions.
一战前，德国开始在中东有存在感，伊朗nationalist对其的印象是a dynamic but relatively benign world power. 对德国模式（以民族主义为意识形态，发展工业，强军）感兴趣。一战开始时，nationalist寄希望于德国对英俄霸权的挑战可以让伊朗获得自由。In reality, however, further misfortunes, prompted by the war, brought the Iranian government to a standstill and the country to further disarray and misery. the country’s sovereignty was undermined, and its people were subjected to starvation and disease directly or indirectly resulting from the military operations.
1900年英国金融家William Knox D’Arcy从Qajar政府取得六十年的石油勘探/生产/出口特许权。1901年Mozaffar al-Din Shah签署。1908年在Khuzestan中部（Bakhtiyari 部落的地盘）发现Masjed Soleiman油田。1909年海军部许可下设立Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)。1914年英国政府控股APOC大头。购买APOC是丘吉尔引以为豪的成就。英国工业、军事对伊朗石油依赖日增，Khuzestan油田安全成为英国人主要关注点。1907年印度兵进驻Bushehr维护工厂和管线安全，1916年升级为South Persian Rifles，控制整个英国在伊朗南部的势力范围。
1914年12月，召集3rd Majles。仍是Democrats与Moderates对立。危机重重，政府频频换人，外国干预人事。1915年，英俄准备瓜分伊朗，试图排除德国和Ottoman势力。nationalist一开始寄希望于德国和Ottoman。德国人支持下nationalist成立Committee for National Defense，向Qom撤退，打算说服Shah迁都Isfahan。德国人安排的政变失败，计划流产。在Qom和Hamadan被俄军击败，西撤到伊朗-Ottoman边境地区，在德国与Ottoman支持下建立临时流亡政府。被进犯的俄军逐出伊朗。和德土签订协议以求在德黑兰恢复nationalist政府。Ottoman在俄军攻击下败走，伊朗抵抗力量很快消失。
一战期间德国人试图在伊朗建立anti-Allied coalition of nationalists and tribal forces。
A number of Iranian Germanophiles among intellectuals and poets of the period, including Mohammad Taqi Bahar, composed popular poems in support of Germany and Perso-German symbiosis. By 1918, however, hopes for a German victory over the Allies fizzled, and with it the prospects of ending the Anglo-Russian hold over Iran. Later during the interwar period, German cultural symbiosis with Iran, underscored by archeological excavations and philological studies of shared Aryan roots, held powerful sway over the Iranian imagination.
The short-lived provisional government in exile, barely lasting until 1917, revealed all the flaws of the nationalist resistance since the days of the Constitutional Revolution: 内斗，新老代沟，为了小事没完没了。支持临时流亡政府的西部部落被欧洲现代化军队打得损失惨重。
南部部落在德国人支持下与英国-印度武装发生冲突。英国人成立South Persian Rifles（战后SPR的移交问题：英国人提条件，要求在英国人指导下成立国家军队。Reza Khan崛起后英国人才终结SPR），由Percy Sykes（外交官，历史学家，殖民主义者，曾出版殖民视角的两卷本History of Persia）领导，和伊朗的gendarme units发生冲突。
Iranian Gendarmerie：1911年Morgan Shuster开始搞的，在伊朗乡下活动，很多军官同情nationalist和临时政府，倾向于德国方。是英国人支持的SPR，俄国人支持的Cossack Division的counterforce。
The collapse of tsarist Russia, then in control of nearly two-thirds of Iranian territory, both terrified and exhilarated Iran：一方面害怕共产主义，另一方面沙俄垮台结束了俄国霸权。布尔什维克新政权谴责1907年的英俄协议，免除伊朗还款要求，取消沙俄时代的各类特许，撤销条约里的沙俄特权，把里海设施还给伊朗，Russian Mortgage Bank的控制权交给伊朗。1921年签订Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship。本地Democrats不少十月革命欣赏者。
Soon the majority of the Iranian polity began to feel the Soviet ideological and military presence. 1919年末，布尔什维克游击队登陆里海港口Anzali，试图夺取俄国舰队，把白军从伊朗北部赶出，最远打到Qazvin。英国人命令下成立的North Persian Force帮助白军，占领伊朗北部。一战结束时Bolshevism在各种幻灭的伊朗nationalist中的吸引力增强。
1919年和英国签订Anglo-Persian Agreement（英国人George Curzon和Percy Cox的主意）。伊朗事实上成为英国的semiprotectorate。
英国实际动机：The British motives for entering into the 1919 agreement sprang primarily from Curzon’s desire to create a chain of mandatory states and protectorates to guarantee a secure overland connection throughout the empire. 控制伊朗军政经济，隔离布尔什维克威胁，把伊朗纳入pax britannica。
伊朗政客，如Hasan Vosuq al-Dowleh内阁，认为协议有助于伊朗恢复秩序，排除布尔什维克威胁，获取急需的资金技术，英国强力支持有利于确保伊朗的主权与领土完整。
Most Iranians detected the ghost of British hegemony，反对签订协议。Vosuq al-Dowleh,和外相Firuz Mirza Nosrat al-Dowleh被nationalists视为卖国者。之前巴黎和会上，英国人想办法阻止伊朗代表主张权益。美国政府也对英国的做法十分不满。
Jangal movement：领导者是Mirza Kuchak Khan。曾参与革命，后来对革命失望。受pan-islamism影响，在Young Turks支持下，一战中在Rasht开始打游击抗俄。He may also be considered a crucial link between romantic nationalism with a socialist flavor and new interpretations of Islam as an anti-imperialist force. 没什么突破，一度式微，直到十月革命。到1918，失去Young Turks支持，Kuchak Khan and his followers deemphasized pan-Islamism and instead highlighted revolutionary socialism。布尔什维克夺回里海舰队，开始支持Jangalis，也让Kuchak Khan失去对运动控制。布尔什维克想借Jangal运动输出俄国革命。从socialist Adalat Party of Baku来的Ehsanollah Khan加入运动。在俄国人支持下，1920年Ehsanollah建立Gilan Socialist Republic。夺下Rasht，被德黑兰政权视为威胁。Kuchak Khan在内斗中失势。
For the Iranians, it was as if the entire world around them were crumbling：Ottoman，Arab，Russian，Germany都情况不妙。1920年，英国mandate发生的什叶起义被镇压。
Reza Khan政变前，There were as many rumors about an imminent takeover of the capital and partition of Iran into a Bolshevik north and a British south as there were yearnings in nationalist circles for the rise of a leader who could offer a viable alternative to the bleak state of affairs.
1920年12月，Moshir al-Dowleh辞职，伊朗政坛群龙无首。4th Majles也组织不起来。Ahmad Shah担心英国人离开伊朗的后果，手足无措。革命时期的领袖disillusioned and divided。
英国envoy Norman于是接受Sayyed Zia（记者，亲英，1919协议的支持者，反布尔什维克）的提议打算搞政变。英国人在伊朗驻军财政上无法维持，相中Reza Khan（有战斗经验，管理经验，反布尔什维克）为合作伙伴。Reza Khan出身低微，野心大，在升官中倚靠英国人，政变受到英国人支持，但Reza不完全是英国人的傀儡。
政变后大规模逮捕软禁。Ahmad Shah任命Sayyed Zia为首相（it was the first made from outside the circles of the Qajar elite, anticipating a new era of middle-class politics）。
With minor variations, Sayyed Zia’s program following a course already set out by the governments of Vosuq al-Dowleh and later Moshir al-Dowleh, and it served as a blueprint for the forthcoming Pahlavi reforms.
宣布和苏联缔结友好条约。苏联放弃沙俄时代特权，表示尊重伊朗主权。条约包含the right to intervene militarily in Iran in the case Iran was threatened by a third party, in effect reaffirming the conduct of tsarist Russia since 1909.
Sayyed Zia的内阁执政百天: nevertheless, was a major shift, for it relied on a coup by a populist British proxy and a Cossack officer to implement a course very different from Curzon’s vision to incorporate Iran into the British colonial sphere. The move cost Norman his career.
Reza’s rise between 1921 and 1925, culminating in his ascent to the throne and the founding of the Pahlavi dynasty, brought to power a new military elite, co- opted some Qajar notables but marginalized the rest, crushed the Jangal movement and other centers of autonomy and secession, bulldozed through a state-sponsored program of secular reforms, and pacified the countryside with ruthless efficiency.
Reza Khan 对暴力扑灭异议毫不犹豫， as long as they could secure the backing of the growing class of professionals, modernist intellectuals, and even a generation of mullahs who exchanged their clerical garb and turban in exchange for European attire. These new sectors laid the foundation for the secular middle class that would form the backbone of Pahlavi Iran.
Two months after the coup, when he assumed the position of minister of war, he was widely recognized as Iran’s savior, and treated accordingly. Reza Khan was a figure reminiscent of Nader in 1732, when he elevated himself to the position of Safavid regent.
Sayyed Zia很快出局。Reza soon realized that collaboration with select members of the Qajar elite and landed aristocracy was more advantageous than working with a rabble-rousing journalist tarnished by his close association with the British.
受到呼罗珊Gendarme军官Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan的反对。叛乱被扑灭。
1921年中解决了内斗严重的Jangal运动。The defeat of the Jangal movement signified the end of a socialist antiimperialist tendency in Iran. Rooted in the Constitutional Revolution, the Jangal movement thrived in its aftermath but lost out to a centralizing state that relied on a superior military aimed to implement a secular state-building project.
阿塞拜疆的民族主义者&社会主义者反叛：Abol-Qasem Lahuti，Mohammad Khiabani，均被扑灭。Contrary to Azarbaijan’s Iran-centered nationalism throughout the constitutional period, and despite the fact that Azarbaijanis acted as the engine for that revolution, both the Khiabani and Lahuti revolts pointed at an emerging ethnic resentment, which would pan out in a generation during the post–World War II Azarbaijan secessionist crisis. 受到Young Turks的pan-Turkism和苏联阿塞拜疆宣传的影响。
Reza Khan’s military not only curtailed the Jangal movement and wiped out the nationalist-Islamic idealism embedded in it but also crushed nearly all sources of tribal resistance to the centralizing state：镇压库尔德Shakak部落和其它不听话部落。部落对中央集权造成威胁。后采取游牧民定居政策，引起不少反抗。
1921年South Persian Rifles合并入中央军队。
抗议阵线组成：部分Majles成员；The parliamentary minority was backed outside the Majles by a handful of journalists and intellectuals, middle-ranking clergy in Tehran and elsewhere, a few tribal chiefs, discontented merchants of the bazaar, and elements of the Qajar court and aristocracy buoyed by the prince regent Mohammad Hasan Mirza (1899–1943)
By autumn 1922 the anti–Reza Khan coalition was able to put a temporary halt to the otherwise irrepressible rise of the commander in chief.
Reza Khan表现不错（纪律，决心，政治精明），赢得英国人和苏联人的欣赏。暂时辞去War Ministry职务，和各方达成和解。By October 1923, when Reza Khan formed his first government, with himself as the prime minister, he extended his power base beyond the military and presented a program of reforms. 得到公众支持。
1923年11月，土耳其共和国成立。凯末尔的经历吸引伊朗知识分子。凯末尔和Reza Khan有某种相似性。5th Majles准备效仿土耳其建立伊朗共和国。受到亲Qajar人士、Qajar贵族、害怕Reza Khan独裁的liberals、害怕Reza Khan的世俗化倾向的教士的反对。
社会风气的变化引起保守人士恐惧：The landed notables, mojtaheds, petty merchants, artisans, and shopkeepers of the bazaar formed the backbone of the conservative sector. 发动穷人搞抗议。
1924年3月22日，五千人在Baharestan Square抗议，反对republicanism。在Majles，温和派领军人物Modarres的操作下，搞共和国的法案没有通过。If Modarres’s opposition to establishing a republican regime was based on the best intentions—that he sensed the coming of a military dictatorship and moved against it—in the end his recourse only helped monarchical autocracy to endure。
凯末尔废除caliphate，让什叶clergy担心Reza Khan也会做类似的事。3月22抗议几天后，Reza Khan去Qom朝圣，和来自Najaf的大ayatollah（其中包括霍梅尼的老师）会面，请他们调解。Reza Shah发布公告称共和制不适合伊朗，assuring the public that he would focus on promoting “Islam’s prominence,” “Iran’s sovereignty,” and a “nationalist government.” 大ayatollah随后也发布公告让大家放心。
Despite all the negative publicity surrounding the republican initiative then and later—that it was a backdoor to Reza Khan’s dictatorship, contrary to Iranian political tradition and against Islam—its defeat proved a major loss for Iran’s political future. 巴列维王朝后来搞世袭monarchy，比军事独裁共和国更不利于政治变革。
In July 1924 the minority in the Majles held a vote of no confidence in the government on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of Reza Khan’s conduct in office, disrespect for the Majles, mistreatment of citizens, and financial misappropriation. Yet their maneuver was defeated by a vast margin. In a short period, the climate had dramatically changed against Modarres and his supporters.
Imbrie Affair：greatly contributed to the atmosphere of fear and intimidation and may have struck the final blow to Reza Khan’s opposition. 1924年七月，出现传言，说出现神奇喷泉，不愿意pay customary donation的巴哈伊当场失明，放弃异端信仰付了钱后立刻恢复。美国legation的Robert Imbrie（为了促成美国石油公司Sinclair Oil和伊朗政府的合作来到伊朗的）也去看喷泉。Imbrie是国家地理杂志的记者，打算在喷泉拍照。被周围的伊朗人反对，不让infidel拍圣泉。被打伤。到了医院后被暴徒当着警察面在手术室殴打，不久死亡。
It never became clear if the incident was a fantastic mob outburst perpetrated against the American diplomat, or against the Baha’is, or more likely a maneuver orchestrated by Reza Khan’s agents that had gotten out of hand.
The incident allowed Reza Khan to declare martial law and round up more of his critics. The Imbrie Affair also allowed Reza Khan to outmaneuver Arthur Millspaugh（美国金融家，反对Reza把APOC的收入都用于军队）。The Imbrie Affair served to cast off the stigma of irreligion from Reza Khan. 各种秀虔诚。
Crafting his own image after these glorious narratives of Iran’s distant past —a notable feature of the emergent Pahlavi era—made Reza Khan and his modernist project appear wholly distinct from the ethos of the Qajar era.
1925年废除Qajar titles，in favor of adopting family names through a national registry. Reza Khan给自己取的姓是Pahlavi，很高大上（an aristocratic clan of the Sasanian period; Middle Persian的别名）。
登基前几个月和Majles的部分deputies频繁会面寻求建议。灌输宪政民主观念失败. Efforts to educate him succeeded only in allowing Iran’s strongman to articulate a nationalist vision of his own of territorial integrity, centralized and effective state power, independent foreign policy, and a program of cultural reconstruction.
1924年秋Khuzestan campaign：It boosted Reza Khan’s prestige and reasserted control over this oil-rich but otherwise isolated and impoverished province. Reclaiming Khuzestan marked the last stage of moving away from the concept of the Guarded Domains of Iran toward the centralizing “Sublime State of Iran” (dowlat ‘alliyeh Iran).
英国人允许Reza Khan的行为： it created a centralized military capable of securing Britain’s investment and strategic interests; he offered a reliable bulwark against the Soviet threat.
More than at any time in its modern history, during World War I and its aftermath, Iran was affected by the military, economic, and human repercussions of a global conflict. The Iranian state survived heavy blows to its sovereignty. The war also brought into light political players, intellectuals, and military officers who were the product of the Constitutional Revolution. The Iranian state employed its meager resources to withstand secessionist challenges. In despair, the ruling elite also subscribed to a halfhearted British effort to resuscitate the Qajar state. Yet the nationalist polity took advantage of the international uproar to successfully resist the semiprotectorate status that the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement offered. Its failure paved the way for the rise of a rough and ready strongman in the person of Reza Khan. In retrospect, Reza Khan’s consolidation between 1921 and 1925 appeared as an unavoidable outcome of World War I.
8 REZA SHAH AND THE PAHLAVI ORDER (1925–1941)
By the fall of 1925 all that was needed to remove the Qajars and establish the new Pahlavi dynasty seemed to be in place: Ahmad Shah自愿流亡；其兄Mohammad Hasan Mirza已被孤立；保皇派已经噤若寒蝉；mojtaheds已经搞定；部落叛乱已经平定；公众满足于秩序与稳定，纵容Reza Khan滥权，不再上街抗议。
1925年10月31日：5th Majles通过法案，废除Qajar王朝，宣布Reza Khan为His Royal Excellency，负责临时政府。修宪后，Majles解散，announced the convening of a constituent assembly to determine the country’s political future. 只受到象征性的反对。
On December 12, 1925, the newly convened constituent assembly unanimously voted for the new Pahlavi hereditary monarchy, and three days later Reza Khan was sworn in as the new shah. 1926年4月的加冕仪式气氛欢乐，和什叶肃穆十分不同，was an event meant to announce clearly the advent of a “modern” era. 新王冠造型inspired by the Achaemenid scaling up motifs as appeared on the ramparts of Persepolis。仪式淡化Islamic成分。
To symbolically right the wrongs of the founder of the Qajar dynasty, one of Reza Shah’s earliest acts was to order that the remains of Karim Khan Zand be exhumed from the ivan of Golestan Palace and reinterred in Shiraz.
上台首个十年，Reza Shah及其支持者准备大跃进。自信现代化强国梦能迅速实现。It was as if the whole nation were ready to make a new start.
之前二十年的民主宪政实验的种种不如意之处，had convinced most urban Iranians of the necessity of the alternative offered by Reza Shah. 一战后国际上不少国家对authoritarianism的认可也正高涨。
As early as 1924 a group of four officials formed an informal alliance that placed them above the old Qajar cabal of the earlier decades. They aimed to harness Reza Khan’s power toward creating a more institutionalized order and transform the regime’s image from that of a mere military dictatorship. Reminiscent of Naser al-Din Shah’s court, the shah controlled his ministers and officers. On the more positive side, the shah was receptive to initiatives his ministers and advisers proposed and saw them through with tenacity. As long as the blend of ministerial initiative and dictatorial drive worked, there was a visible change in the affairs of state, at least in a material sense.
The four civilian ministers soon dominated the new government and initiated many of the reform projects during the first decade of Pahlavi rule.
‘Abd al-Hosain Teymurtash：来自呼罗珊地主家庭，在俄国受的教育，曾管理Gilan。Teymurtash helped shaping Reza Khan’s public image. Though Russian-educated and for a while an Anglophile, under Reza Shah he steered a steady course in tune with Iran’s nationalist ethos. 后来失势，被指控是苏联间谍，1933年被捕，服刑时被谋杀。
Firuz Mirza Nosrat al-Dowleh：Qajar贵族出身，在巴黎学习法律，曾是Vosuq al-Dowleh政府的司法和外交部长。In 1925 he joined the cabinet as minister of finance and later minister of justice, and in collaboration with Teymurtash, he carried through the earliest reform measures of the Pahlavi era. 和英国人走太近，1929年失势，被指控贪污，1936年被流放，后被谋杀。Firuz Mirza was an asset to the new shah, strengthening the regime’s ties with the old nobility and adding to Iran’s international reputation.
‘Ali Akbar Davar：来自中层官僚家庭，在瑞士受的法律教育，早期是左翼激进分子，was most instrumental in overhauling the government administration. 废掉Qajar法案的提出者。As minister of public works in 1925, and minister of justice between 1926 and 1932, and thereafter minister of finance, he was responsible for implementing the most radical reforms under Reza Shah: restructuring the judicial system and introducing modern civil and penal codes, as well as consolidating the framework for public finances. More than anyone else in high office he promoted the cult of state intervention, which in the long run deteriorated into a malignancy. 1937年在对Reza Shah的恐惧中自杀。
Ja‘far-Qoli As‘ad Bakhtiyari：Constitutional Revolution领导者Sardar As‘ad Bakhtiyari之子。He was an important agent of stability in the early Pahlavi era, an advocate of the policies of pacifying the tribes and making them sedentary. 同样被怀疑，失势。在狱中被下毒，1934年被谋杀。
Reza Shah utilized them to his own ends before destroying them, just as Naser al-Din Shah did many decades earlier. 国王权力无限制的政治文化得以延续。
修建从波斯湾到里海的铁路。Yet the Iranian railroad, as it turned out, functioned more as a means of hauling imports into the interior rather than exporting Iranian goods abroad or facilitating the domestic economy. 二战后的阴谋论，称修建铁路是为了推进英国的战略利益。The Khuzestan line helped incorporate the oil-rich province into the state system and enforced Iranian sovereignty in the south. The most expensive and most extensive project ever in modern Iranian history.
公路交通也发展：By the end of 1930s, the road network of fourteen thousand miles—and along with it the culture of motorcars, trucks, and buses—had already began to transform the face of Iranian cities and facilitate the demise of the provinces’ isolation.
出现本土修车业、替换零件制造业，dominated by the technologically savvy Armenians. Armenians of the postconstitutional and early Pahlavi periods contributed more than any other community to Iran’s material modernization and technological culture.
航空和空军发展： By the early 1930s Iran had developed a viable air force of its own.
改造德黑兰：城区改造，修建大型公共建筑 modern functional architecture with a thin veneer of Persian architectural references. 波斯花园和城门不见了。
Major buildings of the Qajar complex, including the royal residential quarters, were razed to make room for the Ministry of Justice and later on the Ministry of Finance, and for other government departments.
Soon thereafter, and increasingly in the 1940s and 1950s, most provincial centers were also subjected to the forces of Europeanized modernity and with mixed outcomes. The old neighborhoods were gradually demolished or badly segmented by the introduction of the Western grid; many instantly turned into slums. 部分历史建筑被毁。
The centralizing economy of the early Pahlavi era was characterized by the state’s intervention in finance, modern banking, trade, and industrialization. 有的政策是constitutional时期的延续，有的是效仿土耳其和苏联。Thanks to the growing population, urbanization, greater consumption, and new sources of revenue—including royalties from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company—the economy grew in size and diversified.
The arrested growth of the private sector（国有经济主导地位）, the widening gap between living standards in the city versus the countryside, and the rise of the state’s reliance on independent income through monopolies on commodities and oil revenue were the most significant legacies of the first Pahlavi era.
收入来源包括石油、糖、鸦片、烟草的专卖。As a sign of the changing times, control of the commercial markets faced no resistance from the bazaar, in stark contrast to the Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892 or the protests against government price controls on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution. bazaar商人是输家，愈发保守，和clergy靠拢。
建立银行体系，取代bazaar金融，和Qajar晚期以来的小型金融网络。建立央行性质的National Bank of Iran，取代英国人的银行发行纸币。改货币名称为rial。钞票印Reza大头。
英俄德成主要贸易伙伴。进口大幅增长。石油外的出口停滞。政府财政依赖石油。Reliance on royalties thus anticipated a long-term pattern in Iranian finances as the state became addicted to oil revenue to finance its needs and less accountable to its citizens.
波斯地毯制造和出口发展，是石油后的第二大出口产品。The early Pahlavi era witnessed a greater awareness of the carpet as a national heritage worthy of protection and improvement.
Workers in industrial sectors, together with workers in the carpet industry, the oil fields, and the service industries, would form the core of the working class. 成立工会。The high inflation of the postwar era wiped out much of the workers’ job security, adding to the discontent and radicalization of labor.
发展公共教育：The state’s emphasis on education, evident from the outset of Pahlavi rule, was the outcome of the modernizing project of the late Qajar period and the constitutional era. From the mid-1920s, with the growth of state-run schools, a standardized curriculum, and a highly regimented pedagogical outlook came to dominate Iranian public education 缺点：reinforced uncritical learning; 人文课程贬低近代伊朗；语言课程played down Iran’s regional and ethnic diversity。极度淡化什叶/伊斯兰identity
设立德黑兰大学：a hotbed of political dissent and a core for antiregime protests and rallies。终结Qatar时代的高等教育机构Dar al-Fonun。前往欧洲留学者增加。代表人物‘Ali Akbar Siyasi，索邦毕业的德黑兰大学校长。
Whereas most French graduates who came to dominate Iranian higher education remained loyal to the post–World War II nationalist cause, the Iranian graduates of the German system often tilted toward the left and were influential in shaping of the Tudeh Party and other independent socialist tendencies.
Despite the obvious inadequacies of the maktab and the madrasa, the inclusion of such texts as Sa‘di’s Golestan, passages from the Qur’an, the utterly impenetrable Sarf-e Mir in Arabic grammar and syntax, and Jami‘ al-Muqaddimat, a compendium of rudimentary logic, did nurture a level of Perso-Arabic erudition that was largely missing from modern schools.
The modern school curriculum entailed a paradigmatic shift from an overtly Shi‘i identity expressed in Arabic to a rarefied Iranian cultural identity manifest in Persian.
文化民族主义：state sponsorship of Persian high culture; ignoring, or actively suppressing, a plethora of languages and dialects throughout Iran(kurdish, azerbaijani, gilaki, luri, baluchi, arabic…), along with their associated regional cultures and folklores; an obsession with “purifying” Persian of its foreign words. Served to homogenize the Iranian population through education, press, and the media.
强调波斯语的连续性：went hand in hand with renewed interest in Zoroastrianism as the indigenous religion of an “authentic” past, and archeology further buttressed such claim.
德国考古学家、历史语言学家Ernst Emil Herzfeld：excavated the first Achaemenid capital, Pazargadae, and later Persepolis, as well as Sasanian Ctesiphon in Iraq. In his many years of residence in Iran, he was instrumental in raising awareness about Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage among officials in charge of cultural affairs and scholars alike.
Iranian cultural archaism and the coining of “pure” Persian words were never as severe as critics often alleged. 和同期类似做法对比：Very few of the linguistic atrocities that ravaged Turkish, Hindi, or even Tajik succeeded in taking root even at the height of Reza Shah.
负责语言改革的机构：由Mohammad ‘Ali Forughi（用波斯语写作西方哲学史;翻译Avicenna著作;点校Sa‘di的诗歌）领导的The Farhangestan-e Iran. Over the course of six years, Farhangestan proposed Persian equivalents to Arabic, Turkish, and French terms that found public acceptance and became part of everyday language of Iranians. Prudently, however, it avoided the sensitive debate about reforming the script, which Farhangestan’s constitution had called for.
出版各种词典、名著新校版本、百科全书：Close paleographic and bibliographic research unearthed forgotten texts and laid the foundation for a Persian literary canon. In turn, a new cultural and linguistic style was made current through textbooks, the press, literary journals, and later radio broadcasts.
Mohammad Taqi Bahar出版Sabk-shenasi：a systematic study of Persian prose over a millennium, tracing its roots to the pre-Islamic Pahlavi and Avestan languages. 曾随Herzfeld学习古波斯语言。Awareness of the link between pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran served as the impetus to form a Persian canon.
Jamalzadeh写作短篇故事：masterfully employed street language, folk expressions and proverbs, and nuances of regional, class, and ethnic parlance to poignantly depict life in the postwar era.
Mohammad Qazvini: a hybrid scholar between traditional madrasa education and modern Orientalist scholarship. 神学院出身，痴迷东方学学术，曾参与编辑Hafez的Divan。
Edward Granville Browne: 对伊朗人影响大。An exceptional blend of nineteenth-century romanticism, literary and historical scholarship, and antiimperialist advocacy. 出版四卷本The Literary History of Persia.
形成关于伊朗历史的新叙事：纳入pre-Islamic past, The Orientalist scholarship and the state’s support for new archeological expeditions emphasized the Achaemenid Empire as Iran’s moment of civilizational inception and the Zoroastrianism revival of the Sassanian era in late antiquity as a moment of rebirth.
Beyond the traditional Persian sources, Iranians for the first time were learning about the Persian empire. 1934年庆祝Shahnameh千年。
Public display of cultural symbols and the commemoration of Iranian literary and intellectual icons such as Ferdowsi (and later Ibn Sina), made the Iranian nationalist narrative to gradually trickle down to the level of general public.
Ibrahim Purdavud (1885–1968) can be regarded as a key scholar responsible for incorporating ancient Iranians languages and texts into the Pahlavi nationalism. 其生涯clearly displayed the shift from the activism of the constitutional era to Iranian nationalist discourse of the Pahlavi period.
Awareness of Zoroastrianism and revival of the ancient Iranian memories incited a challenge to the whole project of Pahlavi secularism on the side of the Shi‘i clerical establishment. 和ulama关系恶化。clergy地位下降。 eroded an ancient social accord that tied, at least in theory, the “good government” with the “good religion,” the “inseparable twins” as they were known to classical authors. In due course the experiences of the Reza Shah era transformed the Shi‘i clerical establishment into a force of political dissent.
Reza Shah和巴列维精英明确将clerical establishment and what it stood for视为进步阻碍，想方设法缩小其规模，减弱其在保守bazaar sector的影响。
拉拢温和宗教人士，the state never dismantled the clerical hierarchy or the institution of the madrasa, the waqf, and other means of revenue. 部分文化精英早年接受的是madrasa教育。Qom地位提高。
历史叙事里淡化什叶作用，the potent Shi‘i story was diluted into a facile history of the Imams. Even the role of Shi‘ism in the rise of Safavids and as an important element of national identity was downplayed. Most displays of collective rituals were banned. 摧毁Tekkiyeh-e Dowlat.
Clergy面临brain drain：年轻人倾向接受现代教育，做公务员或者从事专业工作。clergy收入减少（国家控制charitable endowments）。
司法改革让学习Islamic jurisprudence变得没用。Shi‘i law of contracts (mo’amelat) was no longer considered valid. Interpretation of law and its enforcement were now squarely in the hands of state courts and thus outside the traditional domain of the jurists. What was left unregulated, however, was the devotional and obligational aspect of the shari‘a dealing with purity and pollutants, as well as rules on prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, alms, and other devotional acts.
The new Pahlavi legal reforms, primarily based on the Napoleonic Code, adopted the French system to reasonable dictates of the Shi‘i shari‘a, and did this perhaps more effectively than many other Muslim countries in the twentieth century. The Islamic provisions in the system proved vital for the state’s legitimacy. Family law部分仍然受到传统律法很大影响。
The dress code of December 1928: The introduction of dress uniformity, with its militaristic undertones, was a radical departure from this landscape of apparel diversity（各种身份的人可以从衣着识别） Like the ideologies obsessed with uniforms in Europe and in neighboring Turkey, the Pahlavi dress code was a powerful tool to transform Iranian society into a bland and featureless mass, amnesic of its diversity and ready to be recast in a Westernized mold.
ulama免于新dress code，但是仍痛恨之，They resented the Pahlavi outfit primarily because Westernized uniformity was a symbolic statement against what they stood for. Having been excluded from the mandatory dress code, the clergy stood out as a historical anomaly and were looked upon by the modernizing middle classes with condescension, if not disdain.
In the aftermath of Reza Khan’s rise to power, and especially during the debate over republicanism, support for unveiling grew as women’s groups organized and demonstrated, casting off their veils and clashing with opponents. By 1934, in the aftermath of Reza Shah’s official visit to Turkey, the new government decree required nationwide mandatory unveiling among all classes.
Ugly scenes of the police forcefully removing women’s chadors in the streets, reprimands and sacking of military and civilian officials who were reluctant to abide by the new policy, and general disregard for conservative sentiments against unveiling cast a shadow over the whole episode. Yet contrary to a common perception that mandatory unveiling was unpopular and oppressive, its liberating effects were undeniable.1941年后强制unveiling停止后只有少数女性自愿穿回。
Intimidated and unsure, the clergy had little choice but to accept the reality in silence; no major fatwa against unveiling was issued at the time, though in later years there was ample resentment toward enforcement of the hijab.
Ulama守旧，不愿意与时俱进：Mohammad Hasan Shari‘at Sangelaji之类愿意有所创新的人被谴责。陈旧的和当代生活不兼容的部分带来的问题：all these remained unresolved.
Greater cleavage between the modern and traditional sectors of Iranian society.
The clergy also lost ground in the public forum against the media and entertainment. 不少保守人士拒绝听广播。
With the growth of modern entertainment, storytelling in coffeehouses and by wandering dervishes, who displayed large-scale paintings as visual aids for their narratives of the Shi‘i tragedies and the Shahnameh stories, gradually disappeared.
By the mid-1930s Reza Shah’s regime had turned increasingly oppressive and unpredictable. Despite the appearance of absolute power, however, the popular base for the Pahlavi order had been eroded and its legitimacy questioned. 1941年Reza Shah被迫退位，英俄再度占领伊朗。
Even though Britain and Russia gave assurances that they would respect Iran’s territorial integrity, in what seemed a predetermined course, 英俄1941年下最后通牒，要求驱逐所有为伊朗政府服务的德国人. Shah照办。红军开始在北部边境集结。BBC开始批判Shah独裁腐败。That the BBC championed the liberal and constitutional cause in Iran was a surprise shift from its earlier condoning of many years of the shah’s autocratic rule. The skeptical Iranian public interpreted the change in tone as proof that Reza Shah was no longer in control, even as a presumption that he was no longer a useful puppet in the hand of his British masters.
Allied air forces began bombing civilian and military targets in major cities, causing havoc and undermining civilian confidence, while leaflets dropped from the air spoke of the occupiers’ benevolence, friendship toward the Iranian people, and desire to leave Iranian territory at the close of the war. 伊朗军队无力抵抗，解散。
英俄逼Reza Shah退位。保证让儿子继位。1941年9月26日王子Mohammad Reza Pahlavi宣誓。Shah被流放到约翰内斯堡，死在那里。
Reza Shah：Perhaps the most influential ruler in Iranian history since Isma‘il I in the early sixteenth century, he was instrumental in carrying out massive changes that transformed Iranian society, culture, and economy. He has been remembered as a man of vision and resolve but also as autocratic, avaricious, and increasingly paranoid. Reasserted sovereignty and carried out nearly all the nonpolitical objectives of the Constitutional Revolution. 建立现代化的centralized国家，engendered an optimistic sense of national identity that revolved around cultural heritage, collective memory, and national symbols. It increased government revenue and efficiency and restrained foreign influences in domestic affairs. It curbed the power of tribal leaders, checked the conservative clergy, and lessened—if not demolished— the long-held monopoly of the Qajar ruling elite.
局限：仍然是农业经济。地主剥削不减（reinforced by Reza Shah’s own greed）。 The industrialization and trade policies relied heavily on government monopolies and state ownership, at the expense of fostering an expansive industrial bourgeoisie.
Uncritical borrowing of Western models and misconceived positivist values, combined with contempt for Iran’s indigenous traditions and cultural mores. The nationalist ideology of the Pahlavi era, too, tended to undermine Iran’s ethnic and linguistic diversity and to accommodate Iran’s long and complex Shi‘i past.
The budding aspirations of the constitutional period for democracy and popular representation were not completely crushed.
9 CHAOTIC DEMOCRACY, OIL NATIONALIZATION, AND DENIED HOPES (1941–1953)
The occupation triggered one of the most eventful episodes in Iran’s modern history and revealed persistent themes in the country’s recent past: the struggle for democracy, foreign intervention, and grave tensions within the polity and between the center and the periphery.
出现石油国有化运动，政治空间扩大，更多出版自由，议会政治回归，新生劳工运动。The resumption of a process that was first started with the Constitutional Revolution but interrupted by the rise of Reza Shah.
政坛老面孔归来：Ahmad Qavam; Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabataba’i; Mohammad Mosaddeq
The new era of political pluralism facilitated under the aegis of the same occupying powers that had helped shut down Iran’s democratic process three decades earlier. 苏联想扩大影响力，输出共产主义；英国人有石油利益；美国人有冷战战略。
In response to the domestic turmoil and foreign ambitions in the 1940s and early 1950s, a potent nationalist response seemed unavoidable. The rise and fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq characterized the successes and failures of the period, revealed first through legislation and parliamentary maneuvers, then through nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, and finally during Mosaddeq’s turbulent term as prime minister. Ending with the coup of August 1953, his story is an unhealed wound in the Iranian persecution narrative and a well-known chapter in the history of covert Anglo-American interventions. Iran’s return to arbitrary Pahlavi rule after 1953 put a premature end to Iran’s perilous experiment with participatory politics.
盟军占领严重干扰伊朗经济：军需超过伊朗经济支持能力，人工贬值伊朗货币造成严重通胀，进出口受干扰。贫穷是造反和加入Tudeh Party的动因。运输大量物资，战后被誉为Bridge to Victory，但是得到很少补偿。
Forughi政府和盟军签约，纸面保证伊朗主权和领土完整，要求战争结束后半年内离开。Forughi’s famous pronouncement in response to public anxiety—“They come, they go, and they don’t bother us” proved a gigantic understatement. 然而约定里，盟军人数不设限，full access to伊朗通信交通设施，可随意hunt伊朗的德国agent（引起亲德人士不满）。
1943德黑兰会议美英苏感谢伊朗政府，承诺提供经济援助，尊重伊朗主权。实际：Iran’s future was not a priority for the Allies.
部落造反：Tribal rebellions were in greater part a response to years of harsh treatment under Reza Shah and to his pacification campaigns. 冲突影响部落经济和周边农村生活。
The central government’s answer to these mounting problems was at best conciliatory, occasionally draconian, and often ineffective. 各方利益角逐。政府频频换人。
局势动荡，军队维稳：the armed forces were reorganized in early 1942, 受美国人支持。1942年军队镇压要求Ahmad Qavam下台的人群。
共产主义者和社会主义者（出狱的，国外流亡归来的，魏玛受训的，苏联受训的）成立Tudeh Party。The Tudeh quickly developed into a disciplined and doctrinaire political machine with growing membership among the intellectuals and urban middle classes and some industrial workers, and with almost complete loyalty to Moscow.
Reza Shah时期镇压左翼，宣布共产党非法。Loyalty to the Soviet leadership over world communism reduced most socialists in the eyes of authorities to dangerous agitators, if not traitors. 共产主义运动从海外招人。
The Tudeh was largely influential among schoolteachers, university students, and some faculty, low-ranking civil servants, intellectuals and some labor organizers, activists in the northern centers such as Rasht and Tabriz, industrial workers in Isfahan, and oil-field workers in the south. Organized and disciplined, at least among its rank and file, the strength of the Tudeh was in its frequent street demonstrations, labor protests, and engaging of the public through its numerous publications and “dialectical” debates. 1946年发动南部油田罢工。和liberal nationalists有某些类似的主张，despite common grounds, the Tudeh did not hesitate to label liberal nationalists as tools of American imperialism.
阿塞拜疆危机：战后撤军时限到了，苏军以保护巴库油田，防止来自伊朗的破坏为理由，赖着不走。Azarbaijan Democratic Party要求从伊朗分裂出去。同期Democratic Party of Kurdistan同样受到苏联支持。
Azarbaijan Democratic Party的领导Sayyed Ja‘far Pishehvari：a communist in action but an ethnic nationalist at heart.
The Azarbaijani Democrats envisioned their role, at least early on, as saviors of all of Iran. 实际：分离倾向明显; 亲苏; 和中央政府争执; 解除中央驻军武装; 解除非阿塞拜疆人职务; 压制反对; and promised to defend itself “to the last drop” against Tehran’s attempts to reintegrate the province. 在阿塞拜疆搞土改，给女性选举权。Subservience to the Soviets aside, the successes of the autonomous government were impressive even in the eyes of critics. No Pahlavi provincial authority had made such gains in a short period. 阿塞拜疆当年曾是伊朗全国革命的powerhouse，分离倾向部分是对Perso-centric nationalism的反应。
Ahmad Qavam（Qajar世家贵族，1906年曾起草Constitutional Decree最终稿）出任首相。1946年1月到1947年12月间担任首相，大搞balancing act，typical of the Qajar elite. 1946年和苏联人谈判（Qavam-Sadchikov Accord）：苏联撤军。成立苏联-伊朗联合石油公司。阿塞拜疆危机是伊朗内政，要和平解决。和阿塞拜疆Democrats谈判：It conceded to them genuine grievances and their proposed reforms while modifying their claim of autonomy by defining the Democrats’ elected assembly as a provincial council. 让四名Tudeh Party成员加入内阁，赢得苏联媒体greatest politician of the East赞誉。
成立Democratic Party of Iran：各方势力的wide coalition。
He formed for the first time a supreme council for devising a planned economy, overhauling labor laws, and reforming the much-abused election laws; he established a stateowned investment bank for industrial and mining developments; and he began to distribute state-owned agricultural lands to small landowners.
内战危险和部落造反，各方压力，Qavam被迫调整。1946年底控制阿塞拜疆。As it turned out, the real winner of the “heroic” return of Azarbaijan to the motherland was not Qavam but the twenty-seven-year-old Mohammad Reza Shah and generals of his army, who were anxious to score a victory to reverse the bad memories of the 1941 fiasco and years of imposing unpopular martial law over the Iranian public.
Qavam政府成立苏联-伊朗石油公司的提议受到反对，法案在15th Majles受阻。Soon after the vote, Qavam’s government, the longest serving in the postwar years, began to crumble. Massive strikes and frequent demonstrations orchestrated by the Tudeh Party and affiliated labor unions, which had become Qavam’s sworn enemies, paralyzed his government.
北方石油concession宣布无效immediately rekindled both in and out of the Majles the longstanding demand to renegotiate the oil concession that had been granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).
伊朗人政府分得利益少，伊朗人员受英国人歧视，工人被剥削：The AIOC—the forerunner of today’s British Petroleum (BP)— ran the Iranian oil industry not unlike a colonial plantation, exerting the hierarchy of class-conscious English society and preserving a culture of colonial privilege.
With negative equilibrium, the nationalists aimed to cancel unfair privileges of both powers and to preserve Iran’s precarious balance in an increasingly polarizing world. （此时西伯利亚发现石油，苏联方面已经不那么急迫了）
Demands for better terms, and eventually for nationalization, 受到战后去殖民化运动的鼓舞。Partitions in Palestine and India were seen as British ploys to divide and prolong colonial rule in a new disguise, in the same way that AIOC was exploiting the fractured Iranian polity for its own benefits.
Besides being an issue of Iran’s moral right over its own resources, the demand for higher oil income became an urgent national cause given the fall in other sources of state revenue. 战后萧条，其它收入减少。Enamored of the then-popular idea of the state as agent of economic development, 伊朗nationalists认为基建与工业发展必须要有石油收入。
Even though the Labour government at the time was nationalizing major British industries including coal and the railroad, the rationale for nationalization was barely extended to investments abroad.
16th Majles选举后，不满选举结果，Mosaddeq要求Shah重选举。In January 1950 when the Tehran electorate went to the polls, Mosaddeq and candidates of the National Front gained the highest number of votes, 通往首相之路的开始。
美国政府和沙特的ARAMCO deal对半分利。By November 1950, when the Majles finally rejected the Supplemental Agreement, the reluctant AIOC began to entertain similar terms of fifty-fifty profit sharing, which, as it turned out, was too late. Despite signs of earlier moderation, the Majles’ Oil Committee—chaired by Mohammad Mosaddeq —was no longer interested in anything short of full ownership of Iran’s oil industry. Razmara提出渐进国有化，激进人士不满。Razmara得罪各方（decentralization program，反腐，土改计划，限制court权力，美国人支持… ）。
1951年，支持Supplemental Agreement的首相Razmara被刺，行刺者是Ayatollah Abul-Qasem Kashani 的追随者。两周后石油国有化bill通过，受到广泛民众支持。Triggered a massive anti-AIOC strike throughout the oil industry, organized by the Tudeh Party. It turned violent and cost many lives
Ayatollah Kashani的政治崛起：clergy重归政坛的标志。As an influential cleric, Kashani appealed to the National Front for he mustered large crowds of the lower-middle classes and the bazaar merchants in support of the nationalist cause. Later as the speaker of the Majles he proved only partially committed to the National Front’s program and soon after became something of a liability for Mosaddeq. By 1953 he had abandoned the National Front altogether and implicitly defected to the shah’s camp, a glaring shift of loyalty to be followed by most members of the clergy.
Fada’iyan-e Islam：激进军事组织。founder and leader was a maladapted seminarian in Qom who once was an AIOC employee in Abadan。受到埃及穆斯林兄弟会启发。战后各种刺杀。Their radical convictions led to their eventual destruction however when in 1955 Navvab Safavi and two of his lieutenants were executed after a failed assassination attempt against the prime minister Hosain ‘Ala.
Mosaddeq身体不好，Qajar贵族出身，在瑞士学习法律。和clergy家庭结婚。Mosaddeq’s somewhat unusual union seems to have helped give him a new perspective on the place of Shi‘i Islam in Iranian society and traditions. 学位论文on will and testaments and inheritance in Islamic law. Examining subtleties of the Shi‘i legal system through the lens of modern European law helped him recognize impediments in enforcing these in a modern context. Reza Shah时期曾短暂在政府任职，均以辞职告终。反对Reza Shah的政策没人听。1928-1943隐居，种地，生病。
1943当选Majles代表，重返政坛。和中产阶级站在一起。He was quick to learn the populist politics of the postwar era and quicker to grasp and indigenize its anti-imperialist message as it circulated throughout the non-Western milieu. Mosaddeq represented a new face of postcolonial leadership pioneered by the likes of Mahatma Gandhi and later by Sukarno in Indonesia and Jamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Yet in contrast to most postcolonial leaders, Mosaddeq was an anomaly: he neither rose from the underprivileged classes or the bourgeoisie, nor did he entertain revolutionary views at the outset of his career.
面临各种困难：英国人反对； Tudeh反对（希望和苏联石油合作）；Shah和保守人士反对；政治盟友反对。担任首相期间反复更改人事任命。管理失误，加上健康问题，焦虑，固执，never allowed him to fully grasp the reins of power.
Social unrest and violent rallies tarnished Mosaddeq’s image as a well-intentioned leader inundated by enmity and intrigue. Serious fractures within Mosaddeq’s own ranks heightened doubts of his political survival.
As the oil dispute heated up and the stakes got higher, other allies of Mosaddeq, such as Baqa’i and Makki, gradually abandoned him; some switched to the shah’s camp, others abstained from taking sides, and others openly criticized the premier.
By mid-1952 it was as if he had exhausted most of his options and was ready for an honorable exit. 但是坚持要完成石油国有化。
Shah怀疑Mosaddeq想推翻巴列维王朝建立共和制。经常和Mosaddeq发生冲突。Confrontation with Britain and engaging in street politics, the shah believed, is bound to result in economic ruination and possibly even a communist takeover. 旧式精英，军队高层，ulama高层，商人，都持有类似观点。
“We sacrificed our lives, we write with our blood: either death or Mosaddeq,” 民众视Mosaddeq为民族拯救者. 美英挫败，本来支持Qavam是不搞coup的最佳选项。
受到公众支持+在海牙胜利，Mosaddeq stood to gain an unprecedented advantage, and he was quick to exploit that in hopes of implementing his reform agenda beyond oil nationalization. 获得full legislative power，实际上rule by decree。
To his credit, Mosaddeq employed his extraordinary powers to carry out a series of urgent reform measures. These included purging the army and the administration of corrupt elements, balancing the budget through higher taxation, and reforming election laws. Yet in reality, the sum total of Mosaddeq’s second government included measures that could least be justified by Mosaddeq’s own moral standards and legal principles. 侵犯civil liberties，实行戒严，管制出版，清洗对手（引起军队，法律系统不满）。
Mosaddeq’s more successful measures in the area of finance, labor laws, rural development, and housing—to the extent they ever were implemented —projected the image of a welfare state committed to the improvement of the standard of living and well-being of ordinary citizens.
1952年10月，和英国断交。英国媒体描述Mosaddeq为a dangerous xenophobe, an erratic rabble-rouser, and—after July 1952—a dictator。
To them, as to many in the British establishment (and the British public at large), clinging to AIOC not only seemed vital for the postwar recovery but also symbolically crucial to project abroad an image of power and prestige, despite the realities of a waning empire.
From the British perspective, the only feasible option in the oil dispute with Iran after the defeat of Ahmad Qavam was to bring about the downfall of Mosaddeq, rather than to opt for leniency or wait for Mosaddeq’s government to fall under the weight of its own difficulties.
伊朗政府和英美谈判没有进展。英国人要求巨额赔偿。It was as if the terms were designed to be rejected, paving the way for an aggressive course. Mosaddeq寻求和解，提出让步，如让ICJ仲裁补偿金额，和AIOC建立partnership等。无果。
By March 1953 艾森豪威尔政府确信政变是唯一选择。
一开始（杜鲁门时）美国的外交政策是supporting nationalist and anticolonial movements all over the world as a bulwark against communism，在调解中也被认为是伊朗盟友，伊朗人认为美国和苏联英国帝国主义者不同。但此时美国政策后来变化。
Mosaddeq访美时，最高法院大法官William O. Douglas表示支持伊朗的石油国有化运动。此人是登山爱好者，多次前往伊朗爬山，长期观察伊朗政治和社会。Douglas called on Truman to value leaders like Mosaddeq and Jawaharlal Nehru as statesmen withstanding communist penetration. 表达对Mosaddeq的个人支持。后来批评艾森豪威尔政府的不义行为。
Mosaddeq是《时代》1951年的年度人物。刊文称Mosaddeq is an inevitable voice of the developing world’s national aspirations who nevertheless is a hazard to the West’s economic and strategic concerns.
By early 1953 the image of the United States as a benevolent savior of the weak had fully evaporated in the heat of the oil dispute.
1953年早期，美国驻伊朗使节Loy Henderson预测Mosaddeq正在失去支持，迟早被迫支持Tudeh Party，然后Tudeh会夺权，变成亲苏政权。Henderson也倾向于除掉Mosaddeq。
Despite the joint American and British pressure, and the behind-the-scenes selection of Fazlollah Zahedi as a viable replacement, the shah was not willing to dismiss Mosaddeq outright. Shah害怕1952年7月的情况重演，打算等到Mosaddeq山穷水尽。
7月21日周年，Mosaddeq called for a public referendum to ratify his decision to dissolve the Majles, amend the election laws, and rule by decree.
The referendum, carried out in mid-July 1953 haphazardly and without any serious debate, was unprecedented and clearly damaging to Mosaddeq’s image as a man of principle. 反对公投者指责Mosaddeq 独裁，煽动民众。
美国彻底停止调停，也不给承诺的一亿美元贷款。The oil dispute had reached total deadlock despite Mosaddeq’s conciliatory pleas, and he had alienated the shah and most ranking army officers. Short of quitting, appealing to the people on the streets and mobilizing the public remained the only available path to Mosaddeq.
The news of the failed coup had a great radicalizing effect on Mosaddeq’s supporters. On the same day Mosaddeq officially dissolved the Majles and in a public rally openly attacked the shah and the royalist officers involved in the coup. His foreign minister Hosain Fatemi openly called for the shah’s abdication and an end to the Pahlavi monarchy.
Tudeh表达支持Mosaddeq，倡议建立共和国。To many, even among Mosaddeq’s supporters, this was ominous, a euphemism for a Tudeh-dominated pro-Soviet regime.
8月19日，第二次政变。雇佣穷人，包括lutis，妓女，进行pro-Shah游行。军队上街，炮轰首相官邸。Mosaddeq 措手不及。Once Mosaddeq realized that the troops would not be countered by a popular uprising in his favor, as had happened in July 1952, he opted to resist to the last. 挂出白旗（床单）希望停止攻击，没用。和支持者逃走。第二天自首。
Once the military authorities solidified their ground, Mosaddeq was transferred to police headquarters and charged with treason and insubordination. 在军事法庭上为自己的政治生涯系统辩护。上诉无果。
Mosaddeq的困境与悲剧：was that in the outset he tried to fulfill national aspirations while remaining committed to the principles of constitutionalism and democracy. Yet his disturbing display of autocratic conduct toward the end of his premiership may be seen as a conundrum, a vacillation between two modes of constitutional liberalism and radical populism. Mosaddeq and his colleagues also exhibited another dichotomy familiar to the constitutional period: they paid homage to Islam as a source of Iranian identity and courted religious authorities while also hoping to preserve the ideals of a secular society, freedom of the press, and equality before the law—notions that were in contrast to the conservative outlook of the Shi‘i establishment and its radical allies.
Above all, the political volatility of the postwar era and the presence of many players created an environment of perpetual turmoil. A potent combination of security and energy dimmed the chances of nationalist movements at the outset of the postcolonial age and made inevitable violent clashes of interests. Mosaddeq’s own behavior in office did not help alleviate his differences with many domestic and foreign nemeses.
Mosaddeq自己调子定太高，公众期望太高。AIOC and the British government never really offered any plausible deal to Mosaddeq for a viable compromise. Nor could US mediation substantially change the British resolve.
The lack of organized political support with a coherent program contributed to the volatility of Mosaddeq’s power base and his government. 依赖街头政治而不觉其局限。
如果Mosaddeq没有被推翻，下台辞职也是迟早的事。 Yet the prospect of foreign involvement in the form of a conspiracy to oust a nationally mandated leader —almost a prophetic figure—profoundly changed the political climate and brought about a paradigm shift.
The coup of 1953 put an end to an era of political engagement, no matter how imperfect, and launched a second era of Pahlavi autocratic rule that by and large excluded the public from the political process. The fall of Mosaddeq came to be seen by most Iranians as a flagrant intrusion by Western powers into Iran’s sovereignty and economic destiny.
The fall of Mosaddeq turned into a traumatic memory that in the coming decades produced a narrative of victimization. It reinforced not only xenophobic suspicions but also pushed the Pahlavi opposition forces toward an anti-Western—more specifically, anti-American—discourse.